Sexual Orientation: Testing the Universality of International Human Rights Law by Lau, Holning
Sexual Orientation: Testing the Universality
of International Human Rights Law
Holning Laut
Until recently, the United States consistently opposed cultural
relativism while embracing universalism in international human rights
law. Relativists argue that understandings of right and wrong vary
along cultural lines, and thus, definitions of human rights should vary
accordingly.' Islamic states have argued for a Muslim conception of
women's rights;2 China has defended its treatment of political dissi-
dents by invoking Confucian norms;3 and numerous African states
have sought to justify female circumcision' by upholding the practice's
cultural sanctity.' Such assertions of cultural relativism have routinely
elicited American criticism. At the 1993 World Conference on Human
Rights, Secretary of State Warren Christopher proclaimed: "We can-
not let cultural relativism become the last refuge of repression. 6 Since
then, Christopher's words have echoed in the United States's diplo-
matic relations and treaty negotiations. Thanks in part to American
lobbying, universalism now underpins major human rights instruments
such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the In-
ternational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR); and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).
t B.A. 2000, University of Pennsylvania; J.D. Candidate 2005, The University of Chicago.
1 For general background on universalism and cultural relativism, see Henry J. Steiner and
Philip Alston, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics Morals 166-225 (Oxford
1996).
2 See Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Universal versus Islamic Human Rights: A Clash of Cultures
or a Clash with a Construct?, 15 Mich J Intl L 307,329-33,360 (1994).
3 See Michael C. Davis, Chinese Perspectives on Human Rights, in Michael C. Davis, ed,
Human Rights and Chinese Values: Legal, Philosophical, and Political Perspectives 3, 12-16 (Ox-
ford 1995).
4 Female circumcision is also known as female genital mutilation.
5 Steiner and Alston, International Human Rights at 240-54 (cited in note 1).
6 Elaine Sciolino, US. Rejects Notion That Human Rights Vary with Culture, NY Times Al
(June 15,1993).
7 See, for example, Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 Stan L Rev
1479,1495 (2003) (noting that, although American practice may be inconsistent, American rheto-
ric for universal values "has been remarkably consistent from Wilson to Bush"); Nigel Purvis, In
Defense of Universal Law: The Perspective of a Government Practitioner, 92 Am Socy Intl L Pro-
ceedings 244 (1998) (documenting consistent support of universalism throughout the Clinton
administration).
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Although the United States endorsed universalism throughout
the past half-century, its position is increasingly challenged by the
growing international recognition of human rights related to sexual
orientation.8 United Nations treaty bodies and transnational tribunals
have issued numerous opinions recognizing sexual orientation rights
as universal human rights Human rights scholars have also spilled
much ink documenting the emergence of sexual orientation rights." In
the spring of 2003, Brazil introduced a resolution entitled "Sexual
Orientation and Human Rights" in the United Nations Commission
on Human Rights (UNCHR)." The resolution, which will reach a vote
in the spring of 2005,2 reaffirms the fact that existing human rights in-
struments protect sexual minorities."
While international institutions, such as the UN Human Rights
Committee, have declared the universality of sexual orientation rights,
the United States has not concurred. Instead, the United States asserts
culture-based arguments to justify laws that discriminate against sex-
ual minorities. 4 By invoking culture to justify its nonrecognition of
sexual orientation rights, the United States is asserting a relativist po-
sition that conflicts with its historical endorsement of universal rights
that are defined by the UN human rights regime.
8 There exists a variety of rights associated with sexual orientation: equality rights, privacy
rights, freedom of expression, freedom of association, etc. For background on the numerous
rights related to sexual orientation, see generally Eric Heinze, Sexual Orientation: A Human
Right 153-286 (Martinus Nijhoff 1995). I will sometimes refer to these rights collectively as "sex-
ual orientation rights."
9 See, for example, Young v Australia, UN GAOR Hum Rts Comm, 78th Sess, UN Doc
CCPR/Ci78/D/941/2000 (2000) (upholding the rights of same-sex domestic partners to receive
the same government benefits as heterosexual domestic partners); Lustig-Prean & Beckett v
United Kingdom, 29 Eur Ct HR 548 (2000) (voiding a ban on openly gay individuals serving in
the military); Toonen v Australia, UN GAOR Hum Rts Comm, 50th Sess, Supp No 40, vol 2, at
226, UN Doc A/49/40 (1994) (holding that a statute criminalizing homosexual conduct violated
the ICCPR); Dudgeon v United Kingdom, 45 Eur Ct HR 52 (1981) (holding that a ban on homo-
sexual conduct violated the European Convention on Human Rights).
10 See, for example, Douglas Sanders, Human Rights and Sexual Orientation in Interna-
tional Law (2003), online at http://www.ai-lgbt.org/resourcesother.htm (visited Aug 16, 2004);
Michael Thomas, Note, Teetering on the Brink of Equality: Sexual Orientation and International
Constitutional Protection, 17 BC Third World L J 365 (1997); Laurence R. Heifer and Alice M.
Miller, Sexual Orientation and Human Rights: Toward a United States and Transnational Juris-
prudence, 9 Harv Hum Rts J 61 (1996); James D. Wilets, The Human Rights of Sexual Minorities:
A Comparative and International Law Perspective, 22 Hum Rts 22 (Fall 1995).
11 See Johann Hari, At Last the UN Recognises the Need for Gay Rights, Independent 17
(Apr 25,2003).
12 See United Nations Press Release No HR/CN/1086 (Apr 15, 2004), online at
http://www.un.orgNews/Press/docs/2004/hrcn1086.doc.htm (visited Aug 16, 2004) ("The Com-
mission unanimously decided to postpone consideration of the draft resolution on human rights
and sexual orientation to its sixty-first session [in 2005].").
13 Hari, At Last the UN Recognises the Need for Gay Rights, Independent at 17 (cited in
note 11).
14 See Part Il1.
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As international sexual orientation rights continue to develop,
tension will grow between the United States's endorsement of uni-
versalism and its treatment of sexual orientation laws. While American
exceptionalism in foreign affairs may not be new," American excep-
tionalism based on cultural arguments is a recent development. This
Comment argues that American exceptionalism in sexual orientation
law carries unique transnational legal consequences because of its cul-
tural basis. Scholars have asserted that exceptionalism generally de-
creases American credibility, thus diminishing American soft power."
However, with regard to sexual orientation rights, more is at stake: by
asserting cultural arguments regarding sexual orientation, the United
States risks legal consequences borne out in other areas of human
rights, such as women's rights and freedom of political expression.
This Comment is divided into four parts. Part I provides back-
ground on the debate over universalism and cultural relativism. Part II
provides background on the recognition of sexual orientation rights as
a universal human right. Part III discusses the United States's treat-
ment of sexual orientation. Part IV discusses the legal consequences
of the tension between the American positions on universalism and
sexual orientation laws. Specifically, this Comment considers the doc-
trines of international estoppel and treaty suspension to show that, by
asserting cultural relativist arguments about sexual orientation, the
United States will likely jeopardize the international legal principles
that it fought hard to establish in other areas of human rights.
I. UNIVERSALISM VERSUS CULTURAL RELATIVISM
A. The Debate: Its History and Theoretical Underpinnings
Human rights are grounded in the notion that people, by virtue of
being human, have certain fundamental and inalienable rights.17 Under
the international human rights regime, states have an obligation to re-
spect their citizens' human rights. Furthermore, the international
15 See Koh, 55 Stan L Rev at 1481 (cited in note 7). In this Comment, I adopt Koh's defini-
tion of exceptionalism, which includes all instances in which the United States promotes a dou-
ble standard in international affairs. See id at 1483-87 ("[The] most problematic face of Ameri-
can exceptionalism [is] when the United States ... promote[s] a double standard ... propos[ing]
that a different rule should apply to itself than applies to the rest of the world."). By adopting
cultural relativism itself while condemning other states for their adoption of cultural relativism,
the United States promotes a double standard and is thus exercising exceptionalism.
16 See id at 1481, 1487. See also Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Propaganda Isn't the Way: Soft Power,
Intl Herald Trib 6 (Jan 10, 2003) ("Soft power is the ability to get what you want by attracting
and persuading others to adopt your goals."). Thus, soft power includes tools such as diplomacy,
whereas hard power includes the use of force.
17 See Robert D. Sloane, Outrelativizing Relativism: A Liberal Defense of the Universality
of International Human Rights, 34 Vand J Transnatl L 527,541-42 (2001).
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community has both a right and a responsibility to protest when a
state neglects this obligation."
1. Birth of the human rights regime and its universalist
assumption.
The international human rights regime emerged in the wake of
World War II. For most of history, international law governed only the
relationships between sovereign states.'9 However, the Nazi atrocities
of World War II prompted world leaders to believe that international
law should also address a state's mistreatment of its nationals.20 After
World War II, in 1945, the UN Charter created obligations requiring
member states to respect human rights2' and, in 1948, the General As-
sembly adopted the UDHR.2 Since then, the international community
has adopted numerous additional instruments to protect human
rights."
While states readily agree that human rights should be protected
by international law, the definition and scope of human rights remain
contested. One dimension of this debate concerns the universal versus
relative nature of rights.24 During the post-World War II human rights
movement, there was an underlying assumption that human rights are
universal;' that is to say, founders of the human rights regime believed
that a single standard should apply across the globe, transcending cul-
tural, social, and political lines. This is illustrated by the fact that the
18 See Richard B. Bilder, An Overview of International Human Rights Law, in Hurst Han-
num, ed, Guide to International Human Rights Practice 3, 5-6 (Pennsylvania 2d ed 1992) (de-
scribing the emergence of this consensus after World War II).
19 See generally Louis Henkin, Intemational Law: Politics Values and Functions, 216 Col-
lected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law: 1989 IV (Martinus Nijhoff 1990), re-
printed in Steiner and Alston, International Human Rights 113 (cited in note 1).
20 See Bilder, An Overview of International Human Rights Law at 5 (cited in note 18).
21 UN Charter Art 1(3) (stating that the UN's purposes include "encouraging respect for
human rights").
22 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN General Assembly Res No 217A(III), UN
Doc A/810 (1948).
23 For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the Convention Against Torture; the Geno-
cide Convention; the Convention on Elimination of Racial Discrimination; the Convention on
the Rights of the Child; and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women.
24 See Steiner and Alston, International Human Rights at 192 ("One of the intense debates
in the human rights movement involves the 'universal' or 'relative' character, related to the 'ab-
solute' or 'contingent' character, of the rights declared.").
25 See id at 187 (noting that instruments like the UDHR and ICCPR, which form the foun-
dation of the human rights regime, "purport to give a genuinely universal expression to certain
tenets of liberal political culture").
26 See Guyora Binder, Cultural Relativism and Cultural Imperialism in Human Rights Law,
5 Buff Hum Rts L Rev 211,211 (1999) (noting that universalism assumes that human rights prin-
ciples "transcend culture, society, and politics").
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bedrock of the international human rights regime lies in an instrument
called the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
2. The relativist objection to human rights' Enlightenment roots.
Over the years, universalism has been challenged, primarily by
non-Western states. As non-Western states faced mounting criticism
for human rights violations, they began asserting culture-based de-
fenses. Relativists reminded universalists that most non-Western states
did not participate in the drafting of the UDHR because, as subjects
of colonialism, they were not members of the UN.27 Thus, relativists ar-
gue that the human rights regime's assumption of universalism has a
cultural bias, favoring Western norms derived from Enlightenment-era
philosophy.
Although human rights became an integral component of inter-
national law only after 1945, most scholars trace the concept of human
rights to Enlightenment-era liberalism.9 Enlightenment philosophers
emphasized natural rights and natural law. Because these philosophers
stressed the power of human reasoning, natural rights focused on the
individual and the individual's right to life, liberty, and property.29 Ac-
cording to the premise of natural law, governments do not create
those rights; therefore, government's role is simply to enforce them. °
Critics of natural rights eventually pushed the notion into disfa-
vor.31 Philosophers like Edmund Burke, David Hume, and Jeremy
Bentham argued that adopting natural law would lead to social up-
heaval because proclamations of natural rights could displace neces-
27 See Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Human Rights in the Muslim World: Socio-political
Conditions and Scriptural Imperatives, 3 Harv Hum Rts J 13, 15 (1990). China also argued that it
was not adequately represented in the 1940s because the Chinese seat at the UN was held by
Chiang Kai-Shek's rebel regime, which China accused of pandering to its Western allies. See Ann
Kent, China, the United Nations, and Human Rights: The Limits of Compliance 40-41 (Pennsyl-
vania 1999) (noting that China did not take over the UN seat from Chiang Kai-Shek until 1971
and, when doing so, China resisted conceding to the human rights obligations entered into by
Chiang's representatives).
28 See, for example, Sloane, 34 Vand J Transnatl L at 541-52 (cited in note 17) ("[T]he hu-
man rights tradition remains quintessentially a legacy of Western liberalism. It owes its concep-
tual origins to a unique Enlightenment-era synthesis of ... natural law and natural rights.");
Steiner and Alston, International Human Rights at 187 (cited in note 1) ("Observers from differ-
ent regions and cultures can agree that the human rights movement, with respect to its language
of rights and the civil and political rights that it declares, stems principally from the liberal tradi-
tion of Western thought."); David Sidorsky, Contemporary Reinterpretations of the Concept of
Human Rights, in David Sidorsky, ed, Essays on Human Rights: Contemporary Issues and Jewish
Perspectives 88, 89 (Jewish Publication Society 1979) ("This idea [behind human rights] has its
classic source in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century theories of natural rights.").
29 See Burns Weston, Human Rights, in 20 New Encyclopaedia Britannica 656 (15th ed
1992), reprinted in Steiner and Alston, International Human Rights 167, 167-68 (cited in note 1).
30 See Weston, Human Rights at 167-68 (cited in note 29).
31 Id at 169.
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sary legislation. 2 Although the concept of natural rights in its pure
form seemed impractical and antithetical to government, the post-
World War II human rights movement revived elements of natural
law. Human rights are grounded in the natural rights notion that indi-
viduals, by virtue of being human, have fundamental rights.33 Unlike
natural law, however, the human rights movement makes no ontologi-
cal claim that such rights derive from a natural order. Also, the human
rights movement does not assert that the sole reason for government
is the enforcement of natural law.
This close relationship between the human rights movement and
Western liberal thought has led relativists to advocate alternative ap-
proaches." According to relativists, the existing universalist system
forces Western norms upon non-Western states that never underwent
the Enlightenment. Relativists liken universalism to colonization due
to its imposition of so-called Western values.3 For example, China ar-
gues that, unlike Enlightenment philosophy, which focuses on individ-
ual rights, Confucian tenets emphasize community and social author-
ity: values that trump individual freedoms.3 In turn, China has relied
on "Chinese values" to justify its suppression of political dissidents.
Similarly, some African states use culture to justify female circumci-
sion, 8 and many Muslim states cite the Koran to question universal
women's rights as they are defined by the UN treaty system."
3. The universalist defense.
As the cultural relativist movement gained momentum, many
scholars dismissed it as a pretext for oppression. The major defenses
of universalism can be categorized into three broad groups. First, con-
temporary Western philosophers of the Aristotelian and Kantian tra-
dition, such as John Rawls and Martha Nussbaum, have made cross-
32 Id.
33 See Sloane, 34 Vand J Transnatl L at 541-42 (cited in note 17); Sidorsky, Contemporary
Reinterpretations of the Concept of Human Rights at 170 (cited in note 28).
34 See Steiner and Alston, International Human Rights at 187 (noting that the observation
that human rights stem from Western liberal thought "lies at the core of argument by states from
non-Western parts of the world that some basic provisions in [human rights] instruments ... are
inappropriate and inapplicable to their circumstances").
35 See Richard Klein, Cultural Relativism, Economic Development and International Hu-
man Rights in the Asian Context, 9 Touro Intl L Rev 1, 43 (2001) ("Some countries in Asia re-
spond to western criticism of their human rights record by noting that memories of colonization
are very, very recent and very, very clear.").
36 See Joseph Chan, A Confucian Perspective on Human Rights for Contemporary China,
in Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A. Bell, eds, The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights 212,
219-22 (Cambridge 1999); Davis, Chinese Perspectives on Human Rights at 3-24 (cited in note 3).
37 See Davis, Chinese Perspectives on Human Rights at 9-12.
38 See Steiner and Alston, International Human Rights at 240-54 (cited in note 1).
39 See Mayer, 15 Mich J Intl Law at 329-33,360 (cited in note 2).
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cultural arguments for universalism. Rawls argues that society can
achieve an "overlapping consensus" among the world's comprehen-
sive moral doctrines and that this overlapping consensus conforms to
political liberalism.4° Nussbaum builds on Rawls's theory by calling at-
tention to human capabilities as a basis for consensus. Nussbaum has
used her "capabilities approach" to champion universal human rights,
particularly in the area of women's rights."
Second, scholars of non-Western intellectual thought have argued
that human rights definitions are still compatible with their native phi-
losophies, despite their origins in Western liberalism. For instance, Is-
lamic scholar Abdullahi An-Na'im argues that the Koran may be in-
terpreted either to further the agendas of oppressive regimes or to
support a universalist understanding of human rights.41 Similar to
An-Na'im, Confucian scholars like Joseph Chan, Tu Weiming, and
Chung-ying Cheng have used Confucian texts to support universalism;
they argue that there is substantial convergence between Confucian-
ism and political liberalism.3
Finally, scholars have noted that culture is neither static nor
monolithic." Rather, there exists divergence within every major cul-
ture and those dynamics are fluid over time." Thus, states should not
ask for cultural exceptions to human rights laws. Instead, cultures
should evolve to accommodate human rights standards.
B. The Debate: From Theory to Practice
The academic debate over the universality of human rights has
extended into the practice of international law. In the 1990s, cultural
relativism culminated in two notable international declarations: the
Cairo Declaration on Human Rights and the Bangkok Declaration on
40 See generally John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Harvard 1999); John Rawls, Political
Liberalism 133-72 (Columbia 1996).
41 See generally Martha C. Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice (Oxford 1999); Martha C.
Nussbaum and Jonathan Glover, eds, Women, Culture and Development: A Study of Human Ca-
pabilities (Oxford 1995).
42 An-Na'im, 3 Harv Hum Rts J at 15 (cited in note 27) ("Religious texts, like all other
texts, are open to a variety of interpretations. Human rights advocates in the Muslim world
should struggle to have their interpretations of the relevant texts adopted as the new Islamic
scriptural imperatives for the contemporary world.").
43 See Chan, A Confucian Perspective on Human Rights at 212-37 (cited in note 36); Tu
Weiming, Epilogue: Human Rights as a Confucian Moral Discourse, in Wm. Theodore de Bary
and Tu Weiming, eds, Confucianism and Human Rights 297 (Columbia 1998); Chung-ying Cheng,
Transforming Confucian Virtues into Human Rights: A Study of Human Agency and Potency in
Confucian Ethics, in de Bary and Weiming, eds, Confucianism and Human Rights 142.
44 See, for example, Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory & Practice 86 (Cor-
nell 2d ed 2003) ("[C]ultures are complex, variable, multivocal, and above all contested. Rather
than static things, 'cultures' are fluid complexes of intersubjective meanings and practices.").
45 Id.
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Human Rights. In these declarations, Islamic and Asian states, respec-
tively, banded together to proclaim that, although recognition of hu-
man rights is universal, the definition of such rights should be contex-
tualized for culture."
Cultural relativist states have targeted certain human rights in
particular. First, these states have launched arguments against the uni-
versality of women's rights. This attack was evident at the negotiations
for CEDAW'7 as well as the Cairo Convention on Population Con-
trol.4 Second, civil and political rights have been targeted by cultural
relativists. For example, China continues to assert that its suppression
of political dissidents is justified, if not necessitated, by Confucian tra-
ditions." China asserts this position at international conferences and
treaty negotiations whenever other states question China's human
rights record.0
Despite the relativist attacks, Western nations in general, and the
United States in particular, have endorsed universalism. In negotiating
the UDHR, the ICCPR, CEDAW, and numerous bilateral treaties
such as those regarding grants of foreign aid, the United States asserted
its universalist approach. At the 1993 World Conference on Human
Rights, the United States called cultural relativism "the last refuge of
oppression."" Scholarly works have documented the consistent support
of universalism throughout the Clinton and Bush administrations.
46 For background on the Cairo Declaration, see Mayer, 15 Mich J Intl L at 327-29 (cited
in note 2) (noting that the Declaration reaffirmed Muslim states' commitment to fundamental
human rights but asserted "an Islamic countermodel of human rights"). For background on the
Bangkok Declaration, see Michael C. Davis, Human Rights in Asia: China and the Bangkok Dec-
laration, 2 Buff J Intl L 215, 215-16 (1995-1996) (discussing how the Declaration challenged the
application of universalism in Asia).
47 See, for example, Lars Adam Reho Guide to the Travaux Prparatoires of the United
Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 60 (Mar-
tinus Nijhoff 1993) (noting that Morocco proposed an amendment to Article 2 to accommodate
Muslim practice).
48 See Joel Richard Paul, Cultural Resistance to Global Governance, 22 Mich J Intl L 1, 16
(2000) (noting that religious states, namely Muslim states and the Vatican, opposed women's re-
productive rights).
49 See Davis, Chinese Perspectives on Human Rights at 11-12 (cited in note 3) ("While con-
tinuing to crack down hard on dissidents and labour activists, as well as journalists, the govern-
ment has demonstrated an increasing tendency to attempt to justify its policies ... in official hu-
man rights policy pronouncements, such as ... the Bangkok Declaration.").
50 For example, in its policy statement at the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights,
China asserted its interpretation of Confucianism by stating: "Nobody shall place his own rights
and interests above those of the state and society, nor should he be allowed to impair those of
others and the general public." Statement by Liu Huaqui, Head of the Chinese Delegation, in
Stephen C. Angle and Marina Svensson, eds, The Chinese Human Rights Reader: Documents and
Commentary 1900-2000 390,393 (M.E. Sharpe 2001).
51 Sciolino, US Rejects Notion That Human Rights Vary with Culture, NY Times at Al
(cited in note 6).
52 See note 7. One should note that some scholars have highlighted the United States's
uses of federalism and capitalism to raise treaty reservations, likening those reservations to cul-
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To this day, states continue to debate universalism and cultural
relativism. 3 However, through the lobbying of powerful states such as
the United States, universalism continues to underpin the legal struc-
ture of many human rights issues, such as women's rights and freedom
of political expression.
CEDAW condemns the application of cultural relativism to
women's rights; its provisions are resoundingly universalist.6' Despite
opposition from Muslim states, the final version of CEDAW includes
Articles 2(f) and 5(a), which require all states to modify customary
and cultural practices that discriminate against women.5 When signing
CEDAW, several Muslim states-including Bangladesh, Egypt, Iraq,
and Saudi Arabia-entered reservations refusing to accept articles
they deemed incompatible with Islamic Shariah, the Koran-based
code of law. However, numerous states and scholars have concluded
that those reservations are invalid because, according to the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, reservations may not circumvent
the main purpose of a treaty.5 Furthermore, CEDAW illustrates that
the opinio juris component of customary international law has been
established with regard to the universal protection of women's rights.6
tural exceptions. Regarding federalism, see Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Reflections on the Proposed
United States Reservations to CEDAW" Should the Constitution Be an Obstacle to Human Rights?,
23 Hastings Const L 0 727,739 (1996). Regarding capitalism, see Catherine Powell, Introduction:
Locating Culture, Identity, and Human Rights, 30 Colum Intl L Rev 201,205 (1999). For the pur-
poses of this Comment, those reservations will be distinguished from cultural relativist claims
because, unlike the cultural claims addressed in this Comment, they do not derive from moral
doctrines such as Islam, Confucianism, or Christianity. For more discussion on the uniqueness of
the United States's application of cultural relativism to sexual orientation issues, see note 94 and
accompanying text.
53 See generally Steiner and Alston, International Human Rights at 166-225 (cited in
note 1).
54 Id.
55 UN General Assembly Res No 34/180, UN Doc A/RES/34/180 (1979).
56 These reservations are available online at http://untreaty.un.orglENGLISHIbible/
englishinternetbible/partl/chapterlV/treatylo.asp (visited Aug 16,2004).
57 For example, Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, and the Netherlands
all filed official objections against Saudi Arabia's reservation as inadmissible. See id. For schol-
arly publications concluding that the Muslim reservations are invalid, see Jo Lyn Southard, Pro-
tection of Women's Human Rights under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination Against Women, 8 Pace Intl L Rev 1, 21 (1996); Belinda Clark, The Vienna Conven-
tion Reservations Regime and the Convention on Discrimination Against Women, 85 Am J Intl L
281-320 (1991).
58 See Southard, 8 Pace Intl L Rev at 22 (cited in note 57) (concluding that "the so-called
psychological component-opinio juris-of customary law is fulfilled by CEDAW"). Opinio juris
is one of two components of customary international law, the second being usage. For back-
ground on customary international law, see Barry E. Carter and Philip R. Trimble, eds, Interna-
tional Law 134-46 (Aspen 3ded 1999).
One should note that, although the United States has yet to ratify CEDAW, as a signatory
the United States is still obligated not to act in a manner that would defeat the object and pur-
pose of that treaty. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 312(3) (1987).
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Freedom of political expression is similarly grounded in universal
terms. The ICCPR does not recognize cultural exceptions. Signatories
to the ICCPR, including China, are thus held to its universal obliga-
tions.59 Even states that have not signed the ICCPR can be held ac-
countable to the ICCPR's universal terms because most of the
ICCPR's provisions are now regarded as customary international
law.6° Accordingly, the United States legitimately enforces the univer-
sal right to political expression through bilateral treaties, in which it
offers development assistance to foreign states, conditional on compli-
ance with the ICCPR's universalist terms. 6' As a further indication of
cultural relativism's inapplicability to political expression, one should
note that there is a case pending in the Southern District of New York,
brought under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), alleging that Chi-
nese Premier Li Peng violated Tiananmen Square protesters' rights to
peaceful assembly and association.u It is doubtful that the court will
interpret expressive rights as being relative to Chinese culture.
The current legal infrastructures of women's human rights and
the right to political expression illustrate that the scale between cul-
tural relativism and universalism currently weighs in favor of univers-
alism. The status quo, however, is a delicate one. As Part IV of this
Comment will show, the United States's posture on sexual orientation
increasingly lends weight to relativism, jeopardizing, inter alia, univer-
sal women's rights and universal rights to political expression.
II. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Over the past decade, universal human rights related to sexual
orientation emerged. At the outset, I should note that recognition of
sexual orientation rights is still developing. The contours of sexual ori-
entation rights are unclear. Indeed, there is no human rights treaty
59 China has signed but not ratified the ICCPR.
60 See General Comment No 24, UN GAOR Human Rights Committee, 52d Session, UN
Doc CCPR/C/21/Revl/Add6 8 (1994) (listing ICCPR provisions that qualify as customary
law). See also Nicole Fritz and Martin Flaherty, Unjust Order: Malaysia's Internal Security Act, 26
Fordham Intl L J 1345, 1371-72 (2003) ("[T]he ICCPR has met with such consistent endorse-
ment and compliance that many of its provisions are now said to reflect customary international
law.").
61 For general background on enforcement of human rights standards through conditional
development assistance, see Steiner and Alston, International Human Rights at 811-61 (cited in
note 1).
62 See Complaint, Zhou v Peng, No. 00 Civ 6446, $ 65 (SD NY filed Aug 28,2000), online at
http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legallhuman-rights/docs/Complaint-Feng-Suo_- Zhou.pdf (visited Aug
16,2004). Although the court held in September 2003 that plaintiffs' mode of service to Li Peng
was unconstitutional, Zhou v Peng, 286 F Supp 2d 255 (SD NY 2003), plaintiffs' counsel an-
nounced in a press release that they were preparing to challenge that decision and proceed with
the case. See Press Release, Feng Suo Zhou v Li Peng, online at http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legall
human-rights/rightsArticle.asp?ObjlD=ld9daNyMoA&Content=185 (visited Aug 16,2004).
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with the words "sexual orientation" in its title, nor any treaty that spe-
cifically delineates sexual orientation rights. Furthermore, like
women's rights, sexual orientation rights have yet to achieve the status
of international customary law;6 numerous states, including the
United States, still refuse to fully extend human rights protections to
sexual minorities.-
Despite these facts, however, UN treaty bodies and transnational
tribunals have declared that sexual minorities are protected by exist-
ing human rights treaties such as the ICCPR. That is to say, at least ac-
cording to international institutions such as the UN, sexual orientation
rights fall within the scope of existing treaties and, accordingly, states
are obligated to respect those rights. According to mainstream inter-
national law, when treaty and customary law are unclear, international
court decisions and the writings of international jurists serve as a sub-
sidiary source of law." Thus, statements from the UN system and opin-
ions from human rights tribunals serve as a subsidiary source of law.
Furthermore, international lawyers give great deference to UN treaty
bodies' interpretation of human rights treaties." Thus, many human
rights scholars believe that a body of international law has begun to
amass that protects sexual orientation rights.67 Moreover, national
practices around the world have begun to evolve, thus generating new
human rights norms related to sexual orientation.6
Because the emergence of international sexual orientation rights
has already been extensively documented by other scholars, this Part
will provide an abbreviated account of this movement by highlighting
63 One should note that, although women's human rights have not yet attained the status
of customary law, they have achieved the opinio juris component of international customary law.
See note 58 and accompanying text.
64 See Donnelly, Universal Human Rights at 225-41 (cited in note 44) (noting that, interna-
tionally, discrimination against sexual minorities is still widespread and deep).
65 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art 38(1)(d), 59 Stat 1055, 1060, Treaty
Serial No 933 (1945) (listing subsidiary sources of international law); Diane P Wood, Diffusion
and Focus in International Law Scholarship, 1 Chi J Intl L 141,143 (2000) ("Public international
lawyers point to Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice ('ICJ') for the de-
finitive list of [ ] sources [of international law].").
66 See Deana Pollard, Banning Child Corporal Punishment, 77 Tulane L Rev 575, 592
(2003) (noting that the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child "issues authoritative interpre-
tations" of the Convention on the Rights of the Child); Onuma Yasuaki, Is the International
Court of Justice an Emperor without Clothes?, 8 Intl Legal Theory 1, 26 (2002) (arguing that cus-
tomary law "is far inferior to that of the general international law-creating process based on mul-
tinational treaties of a universal nature or UN declarations"); Heifer and Miller, 9 Harv Hum
Rts J at 77 n 77 (cited in note 10) (noting that "the [UN Human Rights] Committee's 'views' are
not legally binding but rather a strongly persuasive interpretation of the ICCPR, which is binding
on State Parties") (emphasis altered). But see Jack Goldsmith, Should International Human
Rights Law Trump US Domestic Law?, 1 Chi J Intl L 327,331 (2000) (noting that the UN Human
Rights Committee "does not have official judicial or enforcement authority").
67 See note 10.
68 See text accompanying notes 87-91.
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landmark occasions and noteworthy trends from the past decade. Spe-
cifically, this Part will look at transnational case law, statements issued
by UN treaty bodies, the agendas of UN subgroups and international
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), evolving national practices,
and the UNCHR's pending resolution, "Human Rights and Sexual
Orientation."
Among numerous cases that cite international law to protect sex-
ual orientation rights, three are particularly worth discussing: Toonen
v Australia,6' Young v Australia," and Lustig-Prean & Beckett v United
Kingdom.' The UN Human Rights Committee decided Toonen in
1994. In that case, Nicholas Toonen, a gay rights activist, challenged
Tasmania's prohibition on homosexual activity. The Committee held
that the Tasmanian legislation violated human rights pursuant to the
ICCPR. Toonen is noteworthy because, through Toonen's interpreta-
tion of the ICCPR, the UN Human Rights Committee declared that
every signatory of the ICCPR has human rights obligations with re-
gard to sexual orientation.72 Toonen stands for the fact that, although
the ICCPR does not expressly mention sexual orientation, sexual ori-
entation rights are embedded in the treaty's language.
The Committee found in favor of Toonen on two grounds: (1) pri-
vacy rights, pursuant to Article 17;" and (2) nondiscrimination rights,
pursuant to Article 26. The ICCPR does not expressly prohibit sexual
orientation discrimination; Article 26 prohibits discrimination "on any
ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status."'"
However, the Committee found that the ICCPR covered sexual orien-
tation because, "in [the Committee's view] the reference to 'sex' ... is
to be taken as including sexual orientation.""6
Toonen is additionally noteworthy because it expressly dismissed
cultural relativism. Tasmania argued against extending privacy rights
to same-sex couples because of Tasmania's local moral culture." The
69 UN GAOR Hum Rts Comm, 49th Sess, Supp No 40, vol 2, at 226, UN Doc A/49/40
(1994).
70 UN GAOR Hum Rts Comm, 78th Sess, UN Doc CCPR/C/78/D/941t2000 (2000).
71 29 Eur Ct HR 548 (2000).
72 If a state has signed a treaty, even if it has not ratified the treaty, it is obligated under in-
ternational law not to act in a manner that would defeat the object and purpose of that treaty.
See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 312(3) (1987).
73 Toonen v Australia, Supp No 40, vol2, 8.6 at 234.
74 Id $ 8.7 at 234.
75 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art 26, UNGA Res 2200A (XXI),
999 UNTS 171 (Dec 19, 1966, entered into force Mar 23,1976).
76 Toonen, Supp No 40, vol 2, 9 8.6 at 234. For criticism of the Committee's decision to have
"sex" include "sexual orientation," see Anna Funder, The Toonen Case, 5 Pub L Rev 156, 159
(1994).
77 See Sanders, Human Rights and Sexual Orientation at 20 (cited in note 10).
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Committee responded: "[We] cannot accept that for the purposes of
article 17 of the Covenant, moral issues are exclusively a matter of
domestic concern."' 8
Young is another particularly noteworthy case from the UN Hu-
man Rights Committee. While Toonen recognized sexual orientation
rights by decriminalizing same-sex activity, Young elevated sexual ori-
entation from an issue of criminality to an issue of equal opportunity.
In Young, the Human Rights Committee held that Young was entitled
to a government pension because of his status as the same-sex partner
of an Australian veteran." The Committee noted that, pursuant to Ar-
ticle 26 of the ICCPR, Australia had no legitimate reason for denying
same-sex domestic partners government benefits that were offered to
heterosexual partners.8'
Lustig-Prean, which was decided by the European Court of Hu-
man Rights (ECHR) in 1999, is also worth noting because it dealt with
a subject that has been particularly controversial in the United States:
gays in the military. In Lustig-Prean, the ECHR held that the United
Kingdom's ban on gays in the military violated the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights.8' Although the ECHR is a regional tribunal,
the ECHR's decision in Lustig-Prean is nonetheless noteworthy be-
cause various non-European national courts around the world cite to
the ECHR as persuasive authority on human rights norms.0 Professor
John Attanasio has noted that "the ECHR may be becoming a sort of
world court of human rights."'
The emergence of sexual orientation rights is not confined to case
law. After the UN Human Rights Committee decided in Toonen that
the ICCPR protects sexual minorities, four other UN Committees de-
clared that they also interpret their respective treaties-the ICESCR,
78 Toonen, Supp No 40, vol 2,9 8.6 at 234.
79 UN GAOR Hum Rts Comm, 78th Sess, UN Doc CCPR/C/78/D/941/2000 at
11 10-12.
80 Id.
81 29 Eur Ct HR at 548.
82 See, for example, Carl Bruch, Wole Coker, and Chris VanArsdale, Constitutional Envi-
ronmental Law: Giving Force to Fundamental Principles in Africa, 26 Colum J Envir L 131,140
(2001) (noting that the Zambian Supreme Court cited to the ECHR); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Ju-
dicial Globalization, 40 Va J Intl L 1103, 1110 (2000) (noting that the South African Supreme
Court, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, the Constitutional Court of Jamaica, and the Inter-
American Human Rights Commission have all cited to the ECHR); John B. Attanasio, Rappor-
teur's Overview and Conclusions: Of Sovereignty, Globalization, and Courts, 28 NYU J Intl L &
Polit 1, 16 (1995-1996) (noting that Australia, Canada, and New Zealand cite to the ECHR). The
Supreme Court has also cited to the ECHR. See Lawrence v Texas, 539 US 558,573 (2003), citing
Dudgeon v United Kingdom,45 Eur Ct HR T 52 (1981).
83 Attanasio, 28 NYU J Intl L & Polit at 16 (cited in note 82). See also Slaughter, 40 Va J
Intl L at 1109 (cited in note 82) ("Beyond Europe, the ECHR has become a source of authorita-
tive pronouncements on human rights law for national courts that are not directly subject to its
authority.").
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CEDAW, the Convention Against Torture, and the Convention on the
Rights of the Child -to protect sexual minorities. ' Thus, according to
UN treaty bodies, all signatories to the aforementioned treaties hold
human rights obligations with regard to sexual orientation.
The overarching agendas of UN subgroups and international
NGOs illustrate the growing role of sexual orientation in human
rights monitoring. For example, six of the UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights' Special Rapporteurs now include sexual orientation in
their agendas." Major nongovernmental human rights monitors, such
as Amnesty International, also include sexual orientation in their
agendas. Previously, Amnesty International limited its sexual orienta-
tion work to cases of imprisonment, torture, and violence. Since 2001,
however, Amnesty International's mandate has expanded to include
all forms of discrimination based on sexual orientation.
Evolving national practices, particularly in Europe, also illustrate
the growing recognition of sexual orientation as a human right. Euro-
pean states lead the world in sexual orientation law reform. For ex-
ample, in 1994, the European Parliament called upon the Commission
of the European Community to recommend that member states ter-
minate "the barring of lesbians and homosexual couples from mar-
riage or from an equivalent legal framework ... [and] any restriction
on the right of lesbians and homosexuals to be parents or to adopt or
foster children."8' The European Union has also declared that respect
for sexual orientation rights is a prerequisite for states that join the
European Union through its enlargement process.-
84 In a statement of interpretation regarding health care, the UN Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights declared that Article 2(2) of the ICESCR proscribes discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation. CESR General Comment No 14, UN Doc E/C.12/2000/4 Art
12, 18 (Aug 11, 2000). Pursuant to CEDAW, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Dis-
crimination Against Women has called for the decriminalization of lesbianism. See, for example,
Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women:
Kyrgyzstan, UN Doc CEDAW/A/54/38 $$ 127-28 (Jan 27, 1999). Pursuant to the Convention
Against Torture, the UN Committee on Torture has issued declarations criticizing states for
prison conditions that discriminate based on sexual orientation. See, for example, Concluding
Observations of the Committee Against Torture: Egypt, UN Doc CAT/s/XXIXIMisc.4 T 5(e) (Nov
20, 2002). The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has interpreted Article 2 of the Con-
vention on the Rights of Children as barring disparity between heterosexual and homosexual
couples' ages of consent. See, for example, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the
Rights of the Child: (Isle of Man) United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, UN
Doc CRC/C/15/Add.134 22 (Oct 16,2000).
85 See Sanders, Human Rights and Sexual Orientation at 25 (cited in note 10).
86 See id at 35.
87 James D. Wilets, Conceptualizing Private Violence against Sexual Minorities as Gendered
Violence: An International and Comparative Law Perspective, 60 Albany L Rev 989, 1036 (1997)
(quoting the Commission of the European Community).
88 See generally Travis J. Langenkamp, Comment, Finding Fundamental Fairness: Protect-
ing the Rights of Homosexuals under European Union Accession Law, 4 San Diego Intl L J 437
(2003).
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The development of national sexual orientation rights is not lim-
ited to Europe. States across the world have increasingly protected
sexual minorities under either existing nondiscrimination laws or
newly enacted laws expressly prohibiting sexual orientation discrimi-
nation. South Africa, Ecuador, and Fiji exemplify this trend; all three
of these non-European states have modified their national constitu-
tions to explicitly prohibit discrimination on the ground of sexual ori-
entation.9 In another example, Canada legalized same-sex marriages
in the summer of 2003.' Legislation to legalize same-sex marriage is
pending in other nations, including Asian and Latin American states
such as Taiwan and Chile.91
Last spring, Brazil introduced the UNCHR resolution, "Sexual
Orientation and Human Rights." The resolution did not create any
new substantive rights but instead codified the recognition that "the
universal nature of [human rights] is beyond question and that the en-
joyment of such rights and freedoms should not be hindered in any
way on the grounds of sexual orientation." The resolution is sched-
uled to reach a vote in the spring of 2005.9'
III. THE AMERICAN POSITION ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION
In comparison to these international trends, the United States has
been slow to extend basic human rights to sexual minorities. In fact,
the UN Human Rights Committee has criticized the United States's
sexual orientation laws as infringing on human rights protected by the
ICCPR.' In the United States, the premise for withholding civil and
89 See Sanders, Human Rights and Sexual Orientation at 35-36.
90 See DeNeen L. Brown, Canada's Parliament Endorses Gay Marriage: Narrow Defeat of
Motion on Traditional Matrimony Underscores National Divide, Wash Post A23 (Sept 17, 2003).
91 See Paul Wiseman, Same-Sex Marriage Spurs Few Political Ripples in Taiwan, Seattle
Times A10 (Feb 27, 2004) (discussing the pending Taiwanese legislation, noting that Argentina
and Brazil have extended some marriage rights to same-sex couples, and noting that similar leg-
islation is being considered in Chile); Debby Wu, Foreigners Praise Taiwan's Planned Human
Rights Law, Taipei Times 2 (Nov 19,2003) (discussing the pending legislation in Taiwan).
92 Sanders, Human Rights and Sexual Orientation at 30 (cited in note 10) (quoting the pro-
posed resolution).
93 See note 12 and accompanying text.
94 See Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: United States of America,
UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add.50 287 (Oct 30,1995) (noting as a "subject of concern" the "serious
infringement of private life in some states [of the United States] which classify as a criminal of-
fence sexual relations between adult consenting partners of the same sex carried out in private,
and the consequences thereof for their enjoyment of other human rights without discrimina-
tion"). Although this report specifically addressed American sodomy laws before Lawrence v
Texas, 539 US 558 (2003), its interpretation of the ICCPR can be adopted to criticize other as-
pects of American sexual orientation laws. Human rights scholars such as Mary Robinson and
Harold Hongju Koh have cited this report to argue that the United States has violated its obliga-
tions pursuant to the ICCPR. See Brief of Amici Curiae Mary Robinson, et al, Lawrence v Texas,
No 02-102,12 n 16 (filed Jan 16,2003) (available on Westlaw at 2003 WL 164151).
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social rights from sexual minorities is usually culture-based, drawing
from a particular brand of Judeo-Christian norms. This cultural rela-
tivism is evident in the United States's treatment of sexual orientation
in national practice as well as in its foreign relations.
A. Cultural Relativism in National Practice
The United States's national laws regarding sexual orientation
seem to be diverging from international trends. Over the past decade,
other states have been extending civil rights-such as partnership
rights9 and the right to serve in the military" - to sexual minorities out
of a sense of human rights obligations. Meanwhile, the United States
has passed laws to explicitly limit those rights. The justification for
these national practices is usually culture-based. Although the United
States has made no express declaration endorsing cultural relativism,
its national practice suffices to articulate a cultural relativist position
on sexual orientation." This Part discusses evidence of the United
States's national practice.
In 1996, Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act 8
(DOMA), which sought to bar same-sex marriage by defining mar-
riage as "only a legal union between one man and one woman as hus-
band and wife."" The enactment of DOMA illustrates the United
States's cultural relativist position on sexual orientation rights. The
House Report for DOMA explains that the Act was a direct response
to growing support for same-sex marriages 'o' and that DOMA was
necessary because "there is to this issue of marriage an overtly moral
or religious aspect that cannot be divorced from the practicalities.'.' °
The report then explained that heterosexual marriage better comports
with Judeo-Christian norms, citing a study that found that "the Jewish
and Christian traditions have, in a clear and sustained manner, judged
homosexual behavior to be morally wrong. ' 02
95 See text accompanying notes 87,90-91.
96 See Michael Kirby, Law and Sexuality: The Contrasting Case of Australia, 12 Stan L &
Policy Rev 103, 106-08 (2001) (noting that Australia has extended the right of military service to
gays, at least partly because of international human rights considerations, and suggesting that the
United States is lagging behind in reform).
97 Consider Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v
United States), 1984 ICJ 392, 415 (equating conduct with express declarations for the purpose of
an estoppel claim).
98 Pub L No 104-199, 110 Stat 2419 (1996), codified at 1 USC § 7 (2000) and 28 USC
§ 1738C (2000).
99 1USC § 7.
100 HR Rep No 104-664, 104th Cong, 2d Sess 2 (1996). reprinted in 1996 USCCAN 2905.
101 Id at 15.
102 Id at 16 n 54.
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The government's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, 3 which bans
openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual people from military service, is an-
other manifestation of cultural arguments against sexual minorities.
When President Clinton signed "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," many observ-
ers labeled the policy as a compromise between sexual orientation
rights and particular Christian values."" The bill itself does not cite re-
ligious norms; however, it stresses that the policy is necessary for
military "morale."'05 When asked why allowing sexual minorities to
serve in the military would compromise morale, supporters of the ban
cited cultural norms, noting that "heterosexual soldiers do not like gay
soldiers."'"4
Evidence of relativism in American law is not confined to legisla-
tion. Jurisprudence regarding custodial rights of nonheterosexuals also
serves as an example of cultural relativism. Although there is a trend
in family courts not to consider sexual orientation when assessing an
individual's fitness for custodial or adoption rights,'° many courts still
find an individual unfit solely because he or she is not heterosexual,
and offer Judeo-Christian norms to explain why."'
The United States's relativist position is perhaps most clearly evi-
dent in recent presidential statements regarding marriage. For exam-
ple, on February 24, 2004, President Bush discussed his proposed Fed-
eral Marriage Amendment (FMA), which would render legal recogni-
tion of same-sex marriages unconstitutional.'0 4 Bush promoted the
103 Pub L No 103-160,107 Stat 1670 (1993), codified at 10 USC § 654 (2000).
104 See, for example, Backpedaling from His Campaign Promise to Lift the Gay Ban in the
Military, Post-Standard (Syracuse, NY) (July 20, 1993) (characterizing the "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" policy as a compromise); Peter Applebome, Gay Issue Mobilizes Conservatives against Clin-
ton, NY Times A14 (Feb 1,1993) (describing pressure from Christian lobbyists on President Clin-
ton to reach a compromise).
105 10 USC § 654(a)(6), (15).
106 Aaron Belkin, Don't Ask, Don't Tell: Is the Gay Ban Based on Military Necessity?, Pa-
rameters 108, 117 (Summer 2003) ("[S]upporters of the ban point to numerous statistical surveys
showing that heterosexual soldiers do not like gay soldiers."). It is worth noting that, cultural ar-
guments aside, it is unclear that an argument of military necessity justifies depriving sexual mi-
norities of the right to serve. In fact, in Lustig-Prean, the ECHR expressly stated that "necessity"
arguments did not justify the United Kingdom's ban on sexual minorities in the military. 29 Eur
Ct HR at 548.
107 See Kate Kendell, Lesbian and Gay Parents in Child Custody and Visitation Disputes, 30
Hum Rts 8, 8 (Summer 2003) (noting that, over the years, many family courts have rejected
"categorical assumptions based on a parent's sexual orientation").
108 See, for example, Lofton v Kearney, 157 F Supp 2d 1372 (SD Fla 2001) (denying adop-
tion rights on the basis of sexual orientation); Kendell, 30 Hum Rts at 8, 22 (cited in note 107)
(listing cases in which custodial rights were denied because of sexual orientation considerations).
See also Ex Parte H.H., 830 S2d 21, 26 (Ala 2002) (Moore concurring) ("[H]omosexual conduct
of a parent ... creates a strong presumption of unfitness .... Homosexual conduct is ... a viola-
tion of the laws of nature and of nature's God.").
109 See George W. Bush, President Calls for Constitutional Amendment Protecting Marriage:
Remarks by the President (Feb 24, 2004), online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2004/02/20040224-2.html (visited Aug 16,2004).
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FMA by stating, "Marriage cannot be severed from its cultural, reli-
gious and natural roots.", 0 In another official press briefing on the
same day, Press Secretary Scott McClellan discussed the FMA and
confirmed that President Bush consulted theologians in formulating
the FMA." McClellan also supported the FMA by noting that mar-
riage is "sacred. '"2 When a reporter asked, "Is [the FMA] purely based
on [the President's] religious faith?" McClellan responded, "[I]t's
based on his long-held belief... 3 Also, in an earlier press conference on
July 30, 2003, Bush implied that homosexuality is a sin."' These state-
ments from White House press conferences are particularly notewor-
thy because, as Part IV will discuss, such press conferences serve evi-
dentiary purposes under international law.
B. Cultural Relativism in Foreign Relations
Because sexual orientation rights have only recently emerged in
the international context, American treatment of the issue in foreign
relations is limited. However, on those few occasions, the United
States has opposed the extension of sexual orientation rights due to
cultural differences. For example, in the spring of 2003, the United
States refused to support the resolution proposed by Brazil entitled
"Sexual Orientation and Human Rights." When pressed to explain,
State Department spokesperson Richard Boucher stated that the
United States would not support a resolution on sexual orientation
that required "some sort of universal application throughout the
[American legal] system."''.
Boucher's statement appears indicative of the United States's
opposition to universalism regarding sexual orientation. Boucher's
comment may have been motivated in part by federalism since he
noted that sexual orientation issues are often addressed at the local
level."' However, Boucher conceded that antidiscrimination laws do
110 Id.
111 See Scott McClellan, Press Briefing (Feb 24, 2004), online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2004/02/20040224-5.html (visited Aug 16,2004).
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 In addressing sexual orientation issues at the press conference, President Bush prefaced
by stating that he was "mindful that we are all sinners"; commentators have interpreted his re-
marks as a condemnation of homosexuality. See Dick Polman, Gay-Marriage Issue Puts Bush at
Odds with Himself, Philadelphia Inquirer C01 (Nov 30,2003); Pam Lobley, We'll Recoil in Shame
20 Years from Now, Chi Trib C19 (Aug 19,2003); Regarding Sinners: The President's Comments
on Gays, Record (NJ) L06 (Aug 1,2003). See also President Bush Discusses Top Priorities for the
US. (press conference transcript) (July 30, 2003), online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases2003/07/20030730-1.html (visited Aug 16,2004).
115 Richard Boucher, Daily Press Briefing (Apr 25, 2003), online at http://www.state.gov/r/
pa/prs/dpb2003/19959.htm (visited Aug 16,2004) (emphasis added).
116 Id.
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exist on the federal level."' Furthermore, other rights related to sexual
orientation-freedoms of privacy, expression, and association-are
protected on a federal level. In light of the lobbying from conservative
religious groups, one can conclude that cultural relativism played a
role in the State Department's rejection of the Brazilian resolution's
universalist nature. 1
Another example of American cultural relativism lies in the
American opposition to accrediting gay rights NGOs to the UN sys-
tem."' Americans such as Senator Jesse Helms have actively lobbied
the international community against accrediting NGOs such as the In-
ternational Gay and Lesbian Association. To justify his opposition, the
senator criticized the moral composition of such groups.
C. Flirting with Universalism and the Relativist Response
Although this Part has primarily served to highlight religious and
cultural arguments made by the United States against sexual minori-
ties, one should note that sexual orientation rights have in fact pro-
gressed in the United States. In the 2003 case of Lawrence v Texas,2'
for example, the Supreme Court ruled that Texas's criminalization of
sodomy was unconstitutional. In his majority opinion, Justice Kennedy
cited both the ECHR and an amicus brief filed by human rights advo-
cates to argue in favor of sexual orientation rights.' In another 2003
case, Goodridge v Department of Health," the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court held that the state's denial of marriage licenses to
same-sex couples was unconstitutional. The plaintiffs' attorney charac-
terized the decision as a win for human rights, noting that "this really
is an issue about human equality and human dignity.'' .
Yet, cultural arguments against sexual minorities persist. In the
wake of Lawrence and Goodridge, cultural arguments surged in a
wave of backlash. For example, in an official White House press re-
lease, President Bush joined a coalition of twenty-five Christian
117 Id.
118 Religious organizations have lobbied the federal government not to endorse the Brazil-
ian resolution. See Austin Ruse, Demand U.N. and Powell Stop Homosexual Ploy Now (May 2,
2003), online at http://www.conservativepetitions.com/petitions.php?id=190 (visited Aug 16,
2004) (urging American religious organizations to lobby against the resolution).
119 See Douglas Sanders, Getting Lesbian and Gay Issues on the International Human Rights
Agenda, 18 Hum Rts 0 67,97-103 (1996).
120 See id at 100.
121 539 US 558 (2003).
122 Id at 573, citing Dudgeon, 45 Eur Ct HR 52; 539 US at 576-77, citing Brief of Arnici
Curiae Mary Robinson, et al (cited in note 94).
123 440 Mass 309,798 NE2d 941 (2003).
124 Lawyer in Same Sex Marriage Case Applauds Decision (Nov 18, 2003), online at
http://www.cnn.comrTRANSCRIPTS/0311/18/se.01.html (visited Aug 16,2004).
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organizations to proclaim that the week of October 12-18, 2003,
would officially be recognized as "Marriage Protection Week..'. Mar-
riage Protection Week sought to preserve a particular Christian notion
that marriage can only be "a union between a man and a woman. '26
At present, the trajectory of the American position on sexual ori-
entation rights is unclear. As the United States charts its course in
dealing with sexual orientation, there will be consequences arising
from the United States's decisions. The following Part discusses the
consequences that might arise should the United States continue em-
ploying cultural arguments against the recognition of sexual orienta-
tion rights.
IV. LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE AMERICAN POSITION
By asserting cultural arguments to restrict the human rights of
sexual minorities, while international institutions declare sexual orien-
tation rights to be universal, the United States is employing cultural
relativism. If the United States continues to invoke culture to justify
its discriminatory practices, it aligns itself with the cultural relativists
that signed the Cairo and Bangkok Declarations.
By using religion to justify its sexual orientation laws, the United
States is essentially saying that, while it recognizes the international
human rights regime, sexual minorities' human rights should be con-
textualized for culture, in this case American Christianity. That argu-
ment is analogous to Islamic states' argument that women's human
rights should be contextualized for Muslim culture and Asian states'
argument that an individual's human rights should be contextualized
for Confucian culture. Although the universalism-versus-relativism
debate largely hinged on East-West differences in the past, the United
States is nonetheless asserting cultural relativism when it excuses itself
from human rights norms by asserting its particular brand of Judeo-
Christian mores.
The United States creates a double standard by resorting to cul-
tural relativism on sexual orientation rights. In his article, On Ameri-
can Exceptionalism, Harold Hongju Koh notes that double standards
are a type of exceptionalism that is not new to American foreign pol-
icy."' What are the consequences of such American exceptionalism?
Scholars have asserted that American exceptionalism compromises
the United States's soft powers. By reducing American credibility,
125 See Jim Remsen, Week of Events in Opposition to Same-Sex Vows, Philadelphia Inquirer
A07 (Oct 12,2003).
126 George W. Bush, Marriage Protection Week, 2003: A Proclamation (Oct 3, 2003), online
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/newslreleasesl2003/10120031003-12.html (visited Aug 16,2004).
127 Koh, 55 Stan L Rev at 1481 (cited in note 7).
128 See id at 1487. But see Goldsmith, 1 Chi J Intl L at 338 (cited in note 66) (defending
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exceptionalism compromises the United States's soft power to con-
duct diplomacy. There has been a trend, however, among human rights
scholars and practitioners to look beyond these soft effects to the
transnational legal consequences of American exceptionalism. For ex-
ample, human rights advocates have challenged the American treat-
ment of Guantanamo Bay detainees through litigation in American
courts, ' British courts,4 and the Inter-American Commission on Hu-
man Rights.'
Human rights practitioners have increasingly used legal tools to
address human rights issues instead of relying only on lobbying pow-
ers. Many of these legal tools have been characterized as innovative,
sometimes too much so. For example, Belgium's attempt to use uni-
versal jurisdiction to prosecute Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon
and U.S. General Tommy Franks for human rights violations has been
criticized as an example of legal innovation stretched too thin.'2 How-
ever, lawyers' use of the ATCA to enforce human rights law is a legal
innovation that has now become a common practice.'
In this Part, I look at international estoppel and treaty suspension
as legal tools that foreign states may innovatively, but legitimately, use
to impose detrimental consequences on the United States for its dou-
ble standard on cultural relativism. Although international estoppel
and treaty suspension are rarely invoked, they are both doctrines that
are firmly rooted in international law. In the past, these doctrines have
not been invoked to deal with the United States's human rights record
because, until the sexual orientation issue emerged, the United States
has never sought to justify its actions through cultural arguments.'34
American exceptionalism, noting that "[American] [h]ypocrisy is not the unambiguous evil that
it is usually made out to be; it often serves an honorable and important role in domestic and in-
ternational politics").
129 See, for example, Rasul v Bush, 124 S Ct 2686 (2004).
130 See, for example, Abbasi v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,
2002 EWCA Civ 1598 (2002).
131 See Jess Bravin, Panel Says U.S. Policy on Detainees in Cuba Breaks International Law,
Wall St J B2 (Mar 14,2002).
132 See Glenn Frankel, Belgian War Crimes Law Undone by Its Global Reach, Wash Post
A01 (Sept 30, 2003). For a general criticism of universal jurisdiction as a legal innovation, see
Henry Kissinger, The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction, Foreign Affairs 86 (July/Aug 2001).
133 In fact, the Supreme Court upheld the use of the ATCA to enforce human rights law.
See Sosa v Alvarez-Machain, 124 S Ct 2739,2765-66 (2004).
134 For example, to counter allegations that the United States's treatment of Guantanamo
Bay detainees violated international law, the State Department has not made cultural arguments.
Instead, it has argued that the detainees are "enemy combatants" rather than "prisoners of war,"
and thus they are not protected by the Geneva Convention See Dieter Fleck, Towards A Code
of Conduct for Non-international Armed Conflicts: Current Efforts, Problems and Opportunities,
96 Am Socy Intl L Proceedings 25, 30 (2002). Another example involves allegations that the
United States's use of capital punishment violates international law. The United States does not
make cultural arguments to justify its use of capital punishment. Instead, defenses of American
capital punishment are generally a complex composite of consequentialist and retributivist ar-
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Indeed, by singing the song of cultural relativism, the United States
exposes itself to new legal consequences.
The remainder of this Part discusses the conceptual framework
for. applying estoppel and treaty suspension to the United States's
treatment of universalism. Although a single Comment cannot ade-
quately address the comprehensive merits and weaknesses of such ap-
plications, this Comment should serve as a springboard for further dis-
cussion of the ideas proposed below.
A. International Estoppel
In the 1984 ruling in Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States),"' the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated that "estoppel may be in-
ferred from the conduct, declarations and the like made by a State
which ... has caused another State or States, in reliance on such con-
duct, detrimentally to change position or suffer some prejudice.' '3 In
1962, in Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v
Thailand),' Judge Alfaro of the ICJ noted that international estoppel
differs significantly from Anglo-American common law estoppel.'
Common law estoppel has evolved into numerous subcategories of es-
toppel-such as collateral, equitable, and promissory estoppel--all of
which are governed by complex and technical rules. In contrast, inter-
national estoppel is simply defined, broadly grounded in notions of
good faith and consistency ... "The primary foundation of this principle
is the good faith that must prevail in international relations, inasmuch
guments. See Mary Sigler, Contradiction, Coherence, and Guided Discretion in the Supreme
Court's Capital Sentencing Jurisprudence, 40 Am Crim L Rev 1151, 1154-61 (2003) (discussing
arguments used to justify capital punishment). See also Carol S. Steiker, Capital Punishment and
American Exceptionalism, 81 Or L Rev 97 (2002) (explaining that the reasoning behind the
American death penalty is multifaceted). Although retributivist reasoning may include cultural
biases, the hybrid nature of the United States's defense of capital punishment is distinguishable
from the purely cultural arguments it uses to justify nonrecognition of sexual orientation rights.
Furthermore, in international litigation regarding the death penalty, the United States has
avoided defending capital punishment per se, and has instead defended itself through procedural
arguments. See Richard J. Wilson, The United States' Position on the Death Penalty in the Inter-
American Human Rights System, 42 Santa Clara L Rev 1159, 1183-84 (2002) (noting that, in re-
cent international litigation addressing the use of capital punishment, the United States de-
fended itself by challenging the forum's authority and jurisdiction). Because of its hybrid nature,
the defense of capital punishment is not an endorsement of cultural relativism that satisfies in-
ternational estoppel's "clear and unambiguous" test (discussed in Part IVA) or treaty suspen-
sion's "changed circumstances" requirement (discussed in Part IV.B).
135 1984 ICJ 392.
136 Id at 415.
137 1962 ICJ 6.
138 Id at 39.
139 See Megan L. Wagner, Comment, Jurisdiction by Estoppel in the International Court of
Justice, 74 Cal L Rev 1777, 1778 (1986) ("In contrast [to common law estoppel], international es-
toppel draws more sweeping lines.").
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as inconsistency of conduct or opinion on the part of a state to the
prejudice of another is incompatible with good faith.' " °0
After surveying international case law, treatises have restated in-
ternational estoppel as a three-pronged test. For example, according to
Ian Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law, estoppel exists
in international customary law where: (1) there is a statement that is
"clear and unambiguous"; (2) the statement is "voluntary, uncondi-
tional, and authorized"; and (3) there is "reliance in good faith upon
the statement either to the detriment of the party so relying on the
statement or to the advantage of the party making the statement."''
Considering the broad scope of international estoppel, the United
States may face consequences for endorsing cultural relativism. If the
United States continues to apply cultural relativism to sexual orienta-
tion, it may be estopped in the future from applying universalism to
other areas of human rights.
Turning to estoppel's three-part test, what would constitute a
"clear and unambiguous" statement that the United States has begun
to endorse relativism? The United States need not expressly state that
it has adopted elements of cultural relativism. After all, the ICJ has
held that "conduct" speaks as loudly as declarations.'42 Thus, by with-
holding certain rights from sexual minorities while citing Christianity
in lawmaking, the United States sends a statement that despite con-
demnation from the UN Human Rights Committee,'43 it will not fully
extend the ICCPR's antidiscrimination provision to sexual minorities
because of American cultural biases. As sexual orientation continues
to develop as a human right, the United States will need to address
the issue more frequently in international affairs. Future statements
will likely render the United States's cultural relativism even clearer.
The second prong is easy to satisfy. The ICJ has set a low bar for
determining what types of government statements are voluntary, un-
conditional, authorized, and therefore binding. In Nuclear Tests Case
(Australia v France),'" France made general public announcements
that it would discontinue atmospheric nuclear tests. The ICJ held that
France was legally bound by its statements, even though there was no
formal dialogue between France and the other party in the case, Aus-
tralia.141 The ICJ held that France's statements were legally binding be-
140 Cambodia v Thailand, 1962 ICJ at 42.
141 Ian Brownie, Principles of Public International Law 646 (Oxford 5thed 1998).
142 Nicaragua v United States, 1984 ICJ at 415 ("[E]stoppel may be inferred from the con-
duct, declarations and the like made by a State.") (emphasis added).
143 See note 94.
144 1974 ICJ 253.
145 Id at 267-71.
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cause (1) they were made to the public, and (2) they manifested an in-
tent to be bound.'4
In Nuclear Tests, the ICJ cited a presidential press conference and
a televised interview as examples of public unilateral statements that
manifest an intent to be bound.47 Thus, one can infer that the Bush
administration's press conferences are equally binding. As discussed in
Part III.A, the Bush administration has put forth cultural defenses of
the FMA in more than one press conference. Those binding press
statements serve as evidence of the United States's relativist posi-
tion."'
The third prong is also relatively easy to satisfy. Consider this ex-
ample: states such as China have advocated cultural relativism for
quite some time. However, if the United States begins to adopt relativ-
ism, China may rely on American conduct to base its policies more
confidently on cultural relativism. Thus, China may increase its crack-
down on political dissidents, citing Confucian norms in which commu-
nity and social authority trump individual political expression. China
could assert that, because the United States interprets the ICCPR
through a Christian lens, it believed that the United States would con-
done China's interpretation of the ICCPR through a Confucian lens.
Essentially, China could assert that it relied on American conduct to
conclude that the United States would no longer hold it to a universal
standard.
Thus, if the United States continues to assert cultural relativism,
China may seek to prevent the United States from holding it to a uni-
versal standard. China may file a suit in the ICJ,'4' seeking an ICJ order
146 Id.
147 Id. One should note, however, that Nuclear Tests has elicited much criticism for not
clearly defining "intent to be bound." See Jan Klabbers, The Concept of Treaty in International
Law 197-98 (Kluwer 1996) (noting that a determination of French intentions "necessitated the
legal equivalent of a quantum leap," and that Nuclear Tests "proved quite controversial"). In sub-
sequent cases, the ICJ may narrow the definition of "intent to be bound" and a statement's "au-
thority," thus rendering estoppel's second prong more difficult to satisfy.
148 Although there is arguably no fundamental right to same-sex marriage, the UN Human
Rights Committee has stated in dicta that laws against same-sex marriage can amount to a viola-
tion of the ICCPR if partnership laws do not give same-sex couples the rights granted to hetero-
sexual married couples. See Joslin v New Zealand, GAOR Hum Rts Comm, UN Commun
902/1999, Doc A/57/40 (July 30, 2002) (Lallah and Scheinin concurring) (stating that, unless a
state's laws allow for "recogni[tion of] same-sex partnership with consequences similar to or
identical with those of marriage ... [the] denial of certain rights or benefits to same-sex couples
that are available to married couples may amount to discrimination prohibited under article 26
[the ICCPR's antidiscrimination provision]"). (The UN Human Rights Committee has yet to
hear a claim directly on point; thus, it has addressed the question only in dicta.) According to this
logic, China can argue that Bush's use of religion to promote the FMA, while not guaranteeing
same-sex partnership rights, amounts to an act of cultural relativism.
149 Since 1985, the United States has accepted ICJ jurisdiction only on an ad hoc basis. If
China brought an estoppel claim against the United States in the ICJ, the United States would
have the option to decline jurisdiction. However, because of the growing role of litigation in pub-
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of provisional measure, which is akin to an injunction."o At present,
the State Department regularly issues statements condemning China
for not embracing the universality of individual rights. In reaction to
such condemnation, China could argue that the United States was
misinterpreting the ICCPR and seek an order against the United
States. "' Once the United States defended its State Department re-
ports through universalist interpretation of the ICCPR, China could
attempt to estop the United States from making such an assertion.
China could note that the United States employed cultural relativism
as a tool for interpreting the ICCPR in its withholding of the ICCPR's
protections from sexual minorities. Subsequently, China could argue
that the United States must be estopped from asserting that cultural
relativism is an inappropriate tool for interpreting the ICCPR. As dis-
cussed above, all three prongs of the test for estoppel may be satisfied.
Will China really be motivated to file a suit with the ICJ? One
may speculate that condemnation in State Department reports will
lic international law, the United States would be under considerable international pressure to ac-
cept jurisdiction, unless the State Department issued a convincing statement that China's claim
was frivolous. See Richard B. Bilder, The United States and the World Court in the Post-"Cold
War" Era, 40 Cath U L Rev 251,260-61 (1991) (noting that the United States may incur signifi-
cant political costs by not submitting to the IC's jurisdiction). See also Jenny S. Martinez, To-
wards an International Judicial System, 56 Stan L Rev 429,436-44 (2003) (discussing the growing
role of litigation in international public law). But see John R. Cook, The International Court of
Justice and Human Rights, 1 Nw U J Intl Hum Rts 2, 5 (2004) (expressing skepticism regarding
states consenting to ICJ jurisdiction). If the United States declined ICJ jurisdiction, the State
Department would likely be under international pressure to explain why China's estoppel claim
is frivolous. Thus, the United States would need to defend itself against the estoppel claim one
way or another.
Even if the United States declines jurisdiction at the ICJ, states can raise an estoppel argu-
ment against the United States in the UN Human Rights Committee. The United States has, in
fact, agreed to submit itself to the UN Human Rights Committee's power to review adversarial
claims related to the ICCPR. 138 Cong Rec 8070 § 111(3) (1992) (ratifying the ICCPR and de-
claring that the United States "accepts the competence of the Human Rights Committee [to re-
view adversarial claims] ... under Article 41 of the ICCPR"). Thus, any Member State of the
ICCPR can file with the Committee a complaint against the United States for its sexual orienta-
tion laws and, once the United States raises a cultural argument, the doctrine of estoppel can be
invoked.
For the purposes of this Comment, I will discuss the estoppel claim in the context of the ICJ
because an ICJ judgment would carry the greater weight. An ICJ judgment would be binding be-
tween the litigant states, whereas a UN Human Rights Committee opinion would be advisory in
nature, but highly persuasive. Although my discussion uses the ICJ as an example forum, my
analysis also applies to the UN Human Rights Committee because the Committee reaches its
decisions using the same sources of law as the 10, including the general principles of interna-
tional law expressed in ICJ case law.
150 Statute of the ICJ Art 41, online at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/
ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm (visited Aug 16, 2004). See also Bernard H. Oxman and William J.
Aceves, Lagrand, 96 Amer J Intl L 210 (2002) (discussing the binding nature of provisional
orders).
151 Article 36 of the Statute of the ICJ grants the ICJ jurisdiction to hear disputes over the
interpretation of treaties.
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not trigger such a drastic response from China. However, if Chinese
political dissidents continue to sue Chinese officials via ATCA
claims,"2 and if American courts interpret the ICCPR under a univer-
salist lens during the ATCA suit, China may feel more compelled to
bring a claim to the ICJ. China may resort to the ICJ to stop American
federal courts from barring cultural defenses against ATCA claims.
The ICJ could estop the United States from asserting universalism
with regard to the ICCPR and, accordingly, order American courts to
allow cultural defenses in ATCA cases against Chinese officials."
3 An
ICJ order requiring American courts to allow cultural defenses in
ATCA cases would not be the first time that the ICJ directed an order
at American courts. In March 2004, the ICJ ordered American courts
to review fifty-one death penalty cases. "  lthough there are no formal
mechanisms for enforcing the ICJ's orders, noncompliance with ICJ
orders tarnishes a state's international reputation. '
Skeptics may argue that international estoppel should be inter-
preted narrowly, so that the United States should be estopped from
holding other states to universalism on sexual orientation matters and
sexual orientation matters only. That is to say, the United States can
distinguish its position on sexual orientation from its position on other
rights, such as political expression. Even though sexual orientation
rights and political rights are not the same thing, they are governed by
the same treaties: the ICCPR, for example. The ICJ has noted that,
under the doctrine of international estoppel, a state may not "deny[]
that a certain treaty is applicable" to one case while alleging that an-
other state has "not complied with certain provisions of that [same]
treaty."6 Thus, if the United States uses cultural relativism to deny ap-
plication of the ICCPR to sexual minorities, it can be estopped from
preventing China's use of cultural relativism to deny application of the
ICCPR to political dissidents because the parallel scenarios stem from
the same treaty.
Although the doctrine of international estoppel is firmly rooted
in law, it rarely has been formally invoked. This may be due to the fact
152 See note 62 and accompanying text.
153 See generally Cambodia v Thailand, 1962 ICJ 6 (estopping Thailand from asserting its
territorial claim and ordering Thailand to withdraw forces from the territory).
154 See Marlise Simons and Tim Weiner, U.N. Court Orders U.S. to Review Cases of Mexi-
cans, NY Times Al (Mar 31,2004).
155 See Roger R Alford, The Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals: Interna-
tional Adjudication in Ascendance, 94 Am Socy Intl L Proceedings 160, 163 (2000) ("Decisions of
the ICJ and human rights tribunals often are adhered to because of the legitimacy and inherent
fairness of the norm enunciated and because of fear of loss of reputation for noncompliance.").
But see John Yoo and Eric Posner, International Court of Hubris, Wall St J A18 (Apr 7, 2004)
(arguing that ICJ rulings against the United States only tarnish the ICJ's reputation).
156 Cambodia v Thailand, 1962 ICJ at 50 (emphasis added).
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that most inconsistencies in international law are resolved through di-
plomacy rather than litigation. The doctrine has mostly been invoked
in territorial and jurisdictional disputes.'57 However, as noted above,
there is an increasing trend in international law toward dealing with
exceptionalism through transnational legal proceedings. Recently, in-
ternational law scholars have argued that international estoppel can
be legitimately applied to expropriation cases'm as well as cases on
state succession.' Along those lines, it would be reasonable also to
apply international estoppel to the debate on universalism. The doc-
trine has never been invoked in the human rights context, but there is
little reason why it should not apply to human rights. After all, the
principles of good faith and consistency should not be compromised in
human rights law any more than they are compromised in other sec-
tors of international law.
B. Treaty Suspension
If the United States continues to assert cultural relativism with
regards to sexual orientation, other relativist states might develop a
right to suspend existing human rights treaties that were established
on an underlying assumption of universalism. Treaty suspension is not
an immediate risk because parties wishing to suspend treaties are held
to a heavy burden of proof. Nonetheless, if the United States's advo-
cacy of cultural relativism intensifies and other states join the United
States in applying cultural relativism to sexual orientation rights,
treaty suspension will become a possibility.
The international customary law doctrine, rebus sic substantis, lit-
erally means "things standing thus." Black's Law Dictionary defines
the doctrine as the "principle that all agreements are concluded with
the implied condition that they are binding only as long as there are
no major changes in the circumstances."',' The Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties' Article 62 acknowledges the doctrine, but limits it
as such:
A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with
regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty,
and which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as
a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty unless:
157 See Wagner, Comment, 74 Cal L Rev at 1777 (cited in note 139) (noting that historically
estoppel had been invoked in territorial disputes, but in 1984 the ICJ twice applied estoppel to
jurisdictional disputes).
158 See Robert L. Muse, The Nationality of Claims Principle of Public International Law and
the Helms-Burton Act, 20 Hastings Intl & Comp L Rev 777,795-96 (1997).
159 See Peter K. Yu, Succession by Estoppel: Hong Kong's Succession to the ICCPR, 27 Pep-
perdine L Rev 53,89-93 (1999).
160 Black's Law Dictionary 1274 (West 7th ed 1999).
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(a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an es-
sential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the
treaty; and
(b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the ex-
tent of obligations still to be performed under the treaty. "
The International Law Committee (ILC) Commentary on Article
62 suggests that states wishing to suspend a treaty because of changed
circumstances should be held to a heavy burden of proving Article
62's two prongs. The Commentary notes "the need to confine the
scope of the doctrine within narrow limits and to regulate strictly the
conditions under which it may be invoked .... The circumstances of
international life are always changing and it is easy to allege that the
changes render [a] treaty inapplicable."'62
The ICJ has addressed treaty suspension due to changed circum-
stances in only three cases: The Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases (United
Kingdom v Iceland'63 and Federal Republic of Germany v IcelandM)
and Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary!
Slovakia).165 The ICJ's reasoning was similar in all three cases and the
ICJ rejected the treaty suspension claim all three times. A look at the
most recent case, Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, sheds light on the ICJ's high
bar for treaty suspension claims.
In Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, the ICJ emphasized its narrow defini-
tion of "essential" circumstances, "radical" transformation of obliga-
tions, and foreseeability. In 1977, Hungary and Slovakia'66 agreed to
jointly construct a hydroelectric plant on the Danube. Hungary, a for-
mer socialist state, claimed that the agreement was suspended due to
changed circumstances. It argued that the states' partnership served
the purpose of socialist integration; thus, socialism was a fundamental
circumstance leading to the joint venture.
Contrary to Hungary's claim, the ICJ found that socialism was
but one of several circumstances leading to the 1977 treaty. The treaty
not only furthered the two states' socialist partnership; it also served
more basic goals, like providing electricity and 
preventing floods.'6
The ICJ stated that the political and economic goals of socialism were
161 Dietrich Rauschning, ed, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 420 (Metzner
1978).
162 Id at 428.
163 1973 ICJ 3.
164 1974 ICJ 175.
165 1997 ICJ 7.
166 At the time of the agreement, Slovakia (also known as the Slovak Republic) was part of
the former Czechoslovakia.
167 Id 95.
168 Id $ 104.
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"not so closely linked to the object and purpose of the Treaty that they
constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties. ' ' The ICJ
also noted that, although the project's profitability diminished over
time, that difference did not amount to a "radical" transformation of
obligation, which is necessary for treaty suspension.'7 0 Alternatively,
Hungary claimed that changed circumstances regarding environ-
mental laws rendered the project more burdensome. In response, the
ICJ noted: "The Court does not consider that new developments in
the state of environmental knowledge and of environmental law can
be said to have been completely unforeseen.'""
Despite the high bar set by the ICJ, a change in the dynamics of
the universalism debate may suffice to suspend certain human rights
treaties, such as CEDAW. In many ways, such a treaty suspension
claim would be more clear cut than those brought forth in cases like
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros. First, using CEDAW as an example, one can
immediately identify universalism as an essential assumption of the
treaty. After all, CEDAW stands for the "Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women," and the plain
language of the treaty requires states to "modify social and cultural
patterns of conduct" that are discriminatory."' Some states, such as the
Muslim states, consented to CEDAW only as a result of pressure to
conform to the existing assumption of universalism within the human
rights regime. This situation contrasts with the Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros case, in which Hungary and Slovakia very well may have
consented to their agreement for the sake of generating energy, even
if socialism were not part of the circumstances in 1977.
When Muslim states tried to fashion a compromise through a
treaty reservation, Westerners pointed to the fact that those reserva-
tions were invalid because they would circumvent the main purpose of
CEDAW, which is to protect universal human rights for women."4 In
light of these facts, Muslim states have a strong case that a norm of
universalism was an essential circumstance leading to CEDAW.
The challenge that Muslim states would face is proving that the
circumstances have changed significantly enough to trigger treaty sus-
pension. It is unlikely that a change in the American position alone
can be deemed to be a departure from the human rights regime's as-
sumption of universalism. However, if the United States became more
outspoken and convinced other Western states to approach sexual
169 Id (emphasis added).
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 CEDAW Arts 2(f), 5(a).
173 See An-Na'im, 3 Harv Hum Rts J at 15 (cited in note 27).
174 See text accompanying notes 54-57.
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orientation from a relativist point of view, the universalism debate
could very well reach a new tipping point. Accordingly, Muslim states
could argue that the human rights regime's assumption of universalism
has significantly "changed" and that existing treaties, like CEDAW,
should be reconsidered.
Those who are skeptical of a treaty suspension claim brought by
Muslim states may argue that, even if the universalist assumption
changes, Muslim states' obligations pursuant to CEDAW do not radi-
cally transform. That is, the cultural compromises that Muslim states
must make pursuant to CEDAW do not change just because cultural
relativism now applies to sexual orientation. This argument, however,
is myopic because it overlooks heavy political costs.
Although in practice Muslim states should continue to modify
their customs pursuant to CEDAW regardless of the debate over sex-
ual orientation, the political costs associated with those compromises
would intensify enormously if the human rights regime no longer as-
sumed a norm of universalism. If Muslim states cannot exercise cul-
tural relativism, but Western states may do so, they are no longer
submitting themselves to an "overlapping consensus"; rather, they are
submitting themselves to a blatant assertion that American culture is
superior. The notion that all states must evolve to satisfy universal
norms becomes replaced by the notion that Muslim states must evolve
to satisfy American norms.
Thus, although the changed circumstances of the universalism
debate may not raise the direct implementation costs for Muslim
states, the changed circumstances create new political costs. One
should not understate these political costs by refusing to acknowledge
them as "radical." After all, in light of Samuel Huntington's "Clash of
Civilizations" thesis, " the international community should be aware
that such a blatant subordination of Muslim civilization translates into
very significant costs to political integrity.
Skeptics might also argue that a change in the universalist as-
sumption should have been foreseeable. But an assumption of uni-
versalism has undergirded the human rights regime since its estab-
lishment in the 1940s. When Muslim and Asian states issued the Cairo
and Bangkok Declarations, respectively, they failed to significantly al-
ter the human rights regime. Subsequent international conferences
continued to result in human rights treaties with underlying assump-
tions of universalism. In light of the consistency of universalism over
175 Huntington argues that international affairs are entering a new era, in which interna-
tional conflict will be defined along cultural lines that define discrete civilizations; in this era, a
high value will be assigned to the integrity of a state's culture. See Samuel P Huntington, The
Clash of Civilizations?, 72 Foreign Aff 22 (Summer 1993).
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the past six decades, it is reasonable to argue that a shift in the uni-
versalism debate was not foreseeable.
To bring a claim suspending CEDAW, a Muslim state would need
only to file a claim with the ICJ.'76 One can use Saudi Arabia as an ex-
ample. When Saudi Arabia filed a reservation to CEDAW citing the
incompatibility between CEDAW and Shariah, other states and inter-
national law scholars objected to the reservation, concluding that the
reservation is invalid and that Saudi Arabia must be held to CE-
DAW's universal obligations." If the universalist-relativist balance
shifts far enough, Saudi Arabia may file an ICJ suit against any state
that condemns its noncompliance with CEDAW. If the balance shifts
enough, Saudi Arabia can argue that it is no longer beholden to CE-
DAW's universalist obligations because CEDAW has been suspended.
Although the bar for treaty suspension claims is high, CEDAW
may be subjected to treaty suspension if the United States's cultural
relativism grows enough to undermine the human rights regime's un-
derlying assumption of universalism. Compared to the Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros case, the CEDAW example more easily satisfies the re-
quirements for treaty suspension. First, the nexus between universal-
ism and CEDAW is tighter than the nexus between socialism and the
1977 Hungarian-Slovakian agreement. Second, the political costs in
the CEDAW example are more radical than the reduction of profits in
the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case. And third, a change in the underlying
universalist assumption in human rights was not foreseeable, whereas
new environmental laws should have been foreseeable in the Gabcik-
ovo-Nagymaros case.
Although treaty suspension has rarely been invoked in the past, it
may become a more often utilized tool in international law. Recently,
international law scholars have suggested that treaty suspension due
to changed circumstances can apply to treaties including the U.S.-
Soviet Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty,7 ' the Oslo Accords,'79 and the San
Francisco Peace Treaty.'8 Human rights treaties may be next.
CONCLUSION
There exists a double standard between the United States's advo-
cacy of universalism in human rights law and its application of cultural
176 For background on ICJ jurisdiction, see notes 149-51.
177 See note 57.
178 See Frederic L. Kirgis, Proposed Missile Defenses and the ABM Treaty, online at
http://www.asil.orglinsights/insigh70.htm (visited Aug 16,2004).
179 See John Quigley, The Oslo Accords: More Than Israel Deserves, 12 Am U J Intl L &
Policy 285 (1997).
180 See Makoto Nishigai, Comment, The Comfort Women Case in the United States, 20 Wis
Intl L J 371 (2002).
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relativism to sexual orientation rights, and the United States may pay
legal consequences for this double standard. Through the doctrines of
estoppel and treaty suspension, the United States may be forced to
abandon the universalist standard that it fought hard to establish in
areas of human rights including women's rights and freedom of politi-
cal expression.
Skeptics may note that the estoppel and treaty suspension claims
have not yet fully ripened. However, human rights related to sexual
orientation are likely to grow, drawing a sharper contrast with the
United States's relativist stance on the issue. As a result, estoppel and
treaty suspension claims will become increasingly compelling, so long
as the United States maintains its current posture on sexual orientation.
The human rights regime is presently grounded in an assumption
that human rights are universal. However, that universalism is being
tested by the American position on sexual orientation.
